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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the implications of adverse selection in the private
annuity market for the pricing of private annuities and the consequent effects

on constrption and bequest behavior. With privately known

heterogeneous

mor-

tality probabilities, adverse selection causes the rate of return on private
annuities to be less than the actuarially fair rate based on population average mortality. However, a fully funded social security system with compulsory

participation can offer an implied rate of return equal to the actuarially
fair rate based on population average mortality. Thus, since social security
offers a higher rate of return than private annuities, consumers cannot com-

pletely offset the effects of social security by transacting in the private
annuity market. Using an overlapping generations model with uncertain lifetimes, we demonstrate that the introduction of actuarially fair social secu-

rity reduces the steady state rate of return on annuities and raises the
steady state levels of average bequests and average consumption of the young.

The steady state national capital stock rises or falls according to the
strength of the bequest motive.

Andrew Abel
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Uncertainty about an individual's date of death affects the
individual's consumption and portfolio behavior as well as the bequest ulti-

mately left to the consumer's heirs. The early literature on lifetime uncertainty' focused on the effects of stochastic lifetimes on individual consump-

tion and portfolio behavior, ignoring the effects on the bequests received by
subsequent generations.2 Much recent attention has been devoted to the effects
of stochastic lifetimes on bequests and the implications for the distribution

of wealth and the evolution of the capital stock. Sheshinski and Weiss (1981)
extended the Modigliani—Brumberg (1954) — Samuelson (1958) — Diamond (1965)

overlapping generations model to include uncertain lifetimes. They assumed
that all consumers are identical and, furthermore, that all consumers in a

given cohort die at the same date, thereby leaving identical bequests. However, if consumers die at different dates, then they will, in general, leave
bequests of different sizes. Abel (1985) and Eckstein, Eichenbauni and Peled
(1985) exploited the iritra—cohort variation in ex post mortality experiences

to analyze the steady state distributions of bequests, consumption and wealth
in models without private annuity markets and with consumers without bequest
motives.3 Abel (1985) also shows that the introduction of fully funded social
security crowds out steady state private wealth by more than one—for—one and
that it reduces all central moments of the steady state distribution of
wealth.

The effects of social security in the presence of uncertain lifetimes
have been studied by Sheshiuski and Weiss (1981) and Abel (1985) in models in

which there is no private annuity market. However, if a competitive annuity
market were introduced into these models, social security would then have no
effect because the rate of return on private annuities would be the same as

—2—
the rate of return implicit in actuarially fair fully funded social security;
thus

ing

consi.ers would exactly offset the effects of social security by adjusttheir purchases of private annuities. In

private

this paper 'we introduce a

market for annuities and demonstrate that with privately—known hetero—

genous mortality probabilities, social security does have real effects on the

allocation

of consumption. The reason is that adverse selection drives the

rate of return
rate

on competitively supplied annuities below the actuarially fair

of return based on the population average

cx

ante mortality probability;

however, because the social security system is compulsory, it is immune

adverse

to

selection and a fully funded system can offer a rate of return equal

to the actuarially fair rate based on population average mortality.

Eckstein, Eichenbaum and Peled (1985b) examine the welfare—enhancing role
of mandatory social security when the private annuity market is subject to
adverse selection.4 However, there are two features of their model which make

it unsuitable for our purposes. First,

have

because they assume that consumers

no bequest motive, the availability of annuities implies, as noted by

Yaari (1965), that consumers will hold all of their savings as annuities, and
hence there will be no private intergenerational transfers in the form of

bequests. Second, because the consumption good is a non—producible, non—
storable endowment, aggregate savings is zero in every period; the saving of

the young is exactly offset by the dissaving of the old. In contrast, in the
model presented below, the specification of the utility function with a
bequest motive introduces a non—trivial portfolio allocation problem and leads
to intergenerational transfers in the form of bequests. Secondly, in the model
below, the consumption good can be invested at a rate of return R so that

aggregate saving need not be zero. Thus, this model can be used to analyze

—3—
the effects of social security on capital accumulation.

In section I, we examine the optimal consumption and portfolio behavior
of an individual consumer, taking as given the rate of return on private
annuities and the consumer's inheritance received from his parent. Using the
derived demands for private annuities by consumers with different mortality
probabilities, we study, in section II, the determination of the rate of
return on private annuities. In section III, we analyze the steady state

effects of introducing actuarially fair fully funded social security. We show
that the introduction of fully funded social security leads to an increase in
the steady state consumption of young consumers, an increase in the steady
state level of bequests, and to a reduction in the rate of return on private
annuities. Finally, we show that depending on strength of the bequest motive,
an actuarially fair increase in social security taxes will crowd out private
capital by greater than or less than one—for—one.

1. Consumption and Portfolio Behavior of an Individual

Consider a consumer who may live either one period (with probability p>O)

or two periods (with probability l—p>O). Let I be the initial wealth held by
the consumer at the beginning of his life.

(The determination of I will be

discussed below.) During the first period of life the consumer earns a fixed
labor income Y, pays a social security tax T, and consumes an amount

c1

At

the end of the first period, the consumer chooses a portfolio of annuities and

riskiess bonds. Let Q be the amount of annuities held in the portfolio; the
remainder of the portfolio, I + Y —T —

c1

— Q, is held in the form of riskless

bonds. A one dollar annuity pays A dollars to the consumer in the following

—4-period

if he survives; if the consumer dies young, the annuity pays nothing to

his heir. A one dollar riskless bond yields R dollars in the following period

to the consumer,

if

he survives, or to his heir, if the consumer dies young.

As shown in section II, A>R in a competitive annuity market.

At the beginning of the second period, the consumer gives birth to an

heir and then the uncertainty about the length of the consumer's life is
resolved.

If the consumer dies at the beginning of the second period, his

heir receives a bequest, BD, consisting of the consumer's riskiess bonds with
accrued interest,

BD=(I+Y_T_c1.Q)R

(1)

If the consumer survives to the end of the second period, he receives a social

security payment S, consumes an amount C2, and gives the remainder of his
wealth, Bs, to his heir. Since all uncertainty is resolved at the beginning

of the second period., the consumer who lives for two periods knows at the
beginning of the second period that he will leave a bequest of Bs where

B5 =

(I

+

'Y

— T —

c1

— Q)R +QA +

S —

(2)

c2

We assume that the consumer who survives gives his heir the bequest Bs at the

beginning of the second period.

Thus, regardless of whether the consumer

lives one period or two periods, the intergenerational transfer from the con-

sumer to his heir takes place at the beginning of the second period i.e., at
the beginning of the first period of the heir's life.

Let the consumer's utility function be

13(c1) +

p8V(BD) + (1—p)&U(c2) + (l—p)&V(B5)

where & (O<&11) is the one—period discount factor, U( )

is

(3)

a strictly concave

—5-utility index of the conser's own consumption and V( ) is a strictly concave
index of utility derived from leaving a bequest. The utility function in (1)
is simply the expected value of utility, where the only stochastic element is
the consumer's date of death.5

The consumer maximizes the utility function in (3) subject to his life-

time budget constraint. The lifetime budget constraint is obtained by first
substituting (1) into (2) to obtain

Bs=BD+QA+S_c2

(4)

Then combining (1) and (4) to eliminate Q yields

Bs =

A(I

+

!

—T)+ S —

Ac1

—

c2

—

(5)

Substituting the lifetime budget constraint (5) into the utility function (3)
and differentiating with respect to c1, c2, and B' respectively, yields

U'(c1) = (i—p)&A V'(B5)

(6a)

U'(c2) = V7(BS)

(6b>

(l—p) 1E VS(BS)

pVt(BD)

(6c)

Annuities are said to be actuarially fair if the expected rate of return

on an annuity,

(i—p)A, is equal to the rate of return on riskless bonds, R.

Note that actuarial fairness implies that

obtain VP(BD) =

V'(B5)

and hence BD

lows from (4) that c2 = QA + S.6

R

=

—a-—

i—p

so that from (6c) we

Bs. Furthermore, since BD

Bs, it fol-

Thus, if the rate of return on private

annuities is actuarially fair, the consumer's portfolio consists of:

(1)

riskiess bonds which will be given to his heir as a bequest; and (2) annuities

which, along with the social security payment S, will be used to provide for
second—period consumption.

—6—
If the expected rate of return on annuities is smaller than the riskiess
rate of return R, i.e., A < 1A_

then it follows from (6c) that V'(BP) < V'(B)

so that BD > B3 and (from (4)) C2

>

In this case the Consumer does

QA + S.

not use annuities to provide for all of second—period consumption; some of

second—period consumption is provided for by riskiess bonds which have a
higher expected rate of return than annuities.7

In order to obtain explicit solutions for the optimal levels of consump—

tion

1—a_1
and V(B)—,
as in Hakans—

and bequests, we assume that U(c)=

son (1969), Fischer (1973) and Richard (1975), where ?>O indicates the
strength of the bequest motive and a>O. Therefore the utility function in (3)
is ]iomothetic, and the income expansion path for c1, c2, ED and

Bs is a ray

through the origin. The optimal value of each of these variables, as well as

the demand for contingent second—period income QA+S, is proportional to the
expected present value of lifetime resources I + Y — T +AS. It is shown in
Appendix A that

C1

(p,A)

=

Ø(p,A) (I +

Y —

T +

AS)

(7)

wh e r e

0 < (p,A) < 1
and

Q(p,A) +

A1S =

'lj(p,A)(I

+ Y — T +

A'S)

(8)

where

1(p,A) < 1.
Explicit expressions for ô(p,A) and q1(p,A) are presented in Appendix A.

It

can be shown that 8q1/a < 0. Also, q1(p,A) will be positive if and only if

—7-.
1

A > N1_) +

)U]

(

1 +

then

If S=O,

ties.

• R

(9)

a

(9) is necessary and sufficient for a positive demand

for

annui-

With actuarially fair annuities (A=1—), (9) is satisfied.

It is convenient to rewrite (8), the demand for private annuities as

Q(p,A) =

+ Y — T) — q2(p,A)S

q1(p,A)(I

(lOa)

where

=

[1—q1(p,A)]A1

(lob)

Since Q1(p,A) < 1 and 8q118p < 0, it follows from (lOb) that q2(p,A) > 0 and
8

that q2
—
ap

>

0. Therefore, if I+Y—T > 0 and S >
— 0, then

<

II.

.

(11)

Equilibrium in the Private Annuity Market

Suppose that consers are characterized by different probabil ities, p,
of dying young. We will refer to a consner with a probability p of dying
young as a type p consumer. Except for the difference in p, all consumers have

identical utility functions. Let E(p) be the fraction of young consumers with
probability of dying young less

tribution
values

The support of the dis1. We restrict the range of

than or equal to p.

E(p) is [L,R) where 0 <

<

<

of p in the population by assuming that that

(12)

1
(1—ps) (l+?)°+p11X

The effect of this assumption is to guarantee that condition (9) is satisfied
so that if S>0 is sufficiently small, then all consumers will have a positive
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demand for annuities.8

A consumer's probability of dying young, p, is independent of the p of
his parent. Moreover, we assume that each individual knows his own value of p
but that annuity companies and the government are unable to determine an indi-

vidual consumer's p. e assume that there is no aggregate uncertainty; a frac-

tion p of each cohort of type p consumers will die young. Finally, we assume
that annuity companies cannot determine whether an individual consumer holds

annuities from other insurance companies. The effect of this assumption is

that the equilibrium in the annuity market will be a pooling equilibrium
rather than a separating equilibrium.9

Assuming that annuity companies are risk—neutral and perfectly competi-

tive, the expected profits of annuity companies must be equal to zero. Let

M(p,A) be the expected profit per dollar of annuity with rate of return A
issued to a type p consumer. Therefore

M(p,A) =
so thai

ap

annuities,

11

— (1—p)A

(13)

= A > 0. It is obvious that the equilibrium rate of return on
A,

must lie between

R and R

: if A were less than

R

,

then

1—p11

an annuity company could offer a rate higher than A and profitably attract all

R

buyers of annuities; if A were greater than

then annuity companies would

1-p11

suffer expected losses on all annuities sold.

We will now show that the competitive rate of return on annuities, A,
must be less than A, the actuarially fair rate based on population average

—

mortality, where A

—a---

i—p

B
—
p
and p

f pdll(p) is the population average probabil—

—9-ity of dying young. First, we state the following well—known lemma.

B
LEM(A. Suppose that f(p)

0 as p p and that

f(p)dH(p) =

0.

If g(p) is

B

strictly increasing, then

0, with strict inequality if

f(p)g(p)dH(p)

dH(p) is not degenerate.1°

Let 7r(A;I+Y—T,S) be the expected profit of the annuity industry if the
private annuity rate of return is A. Observe that

H
n(A;I+Y—T,S) = 1f M(p,A)Q*(p,A)dH(p)
where Q*(p,A) =

q1(p,A)(I*

(14)

+ Y — T)—q2(p,A)S is average annuity demand of type

p consumers and 1* is the average inheritance received at birth. Using the
relation M(p.A) = M(p,A) + (l—p) (A—A) which follows from (13), we can rewrite
(14) as

B
,t(A;I*+Y—T,S) =

Since

p

f

—

M(p,A)Q*(p,A)dll(p)

— pH

+ (A—A)f (1—p)Q(p,A)dH(p)

(15)

M(p,X)dB(p) = 0 (fr (13) and the definition of ) and since

< 0

(from (11)), the lemma implies that the first integral in (15) is negative.
Since (for S sufficiently nall) the second integral in (15) is positive,

it

follows that if A>A, then n(A)<O. The result that IT(A) < 0 is, of course, a
consequence of adverse selection. Therefore, the equilibrium rate of return A
must lie in the open interval (

i—p i—p
The equilibrium rate of return on private annuities, A, must be a root of
the equation n(A) = 0.

R

Since R

,

i—p

> 0 > r(——) and i(A)

— 10

is
K

—

a continuous function of A, there is at least one root of it(A) = 0
and

for which n'(A) < 0. We demonstrate in Appendix B that, in the

case of logarithmic utility ( =

1),

ir(A) is strictly concave for A > R and

0 in

thus there is a unique root A of ,t(A)

The

between

equilibrium

of I*+Y—T and S.

K ,_i—) and ,t'(A) < 0.11
1_EL

annuity rate of return, A, can be expressed as a function

Observe from (lOa) that Q*(p,A) is a linearly homogeneous

function of I*+YT and S. Therefore, from (14), n(A;I*+Y-T,S) also linearly
homogeneous in. I*+Y—T and S. so that if A satisfies ,i(A;I*+Y—T,S)

satisfies ,i(A;(I*+Y_T),S) = 0 for any

A =

0, it also

> 0. Hence A can be written as

A(I*+Y_T,S)

(16)

where A(.,.) is homogeneous of degree zero.

To demonstrate that aA/,3S

<

0, recall from (lOa) that an increase in

social security benefits leads type p consumers to reduce their demand for
0 q2

> 0, consumers with high p reduce

private annuities by q2(p,A). Since

their annuity demands by more than low p consumers. Furthermore, since high p

consumers begin with a lower demand for annuities than low p consumers, the
percentage reduction in annuity demand is greatest for high p consumers. Now,

since it is the annuities sold to the high p consumers on which annuity companies expect positive profits, this shift in the composition of annuity hold-

away from the profitable (high p) consumers leads to a reduction in
expected profits. In order to restore zero expected profits, the equilibrium
rate of return A must fall (since n'(A) < 0). Thus, the partial derivatives
ers

of A(I*÷Y—T,S) are

<

0

(17a)

— 11 —

aL
a(I+Y—T)

—S

a,L >

I*+Y—T as —

0

as S >
— 0

(17b)

where (17a) follows froa applying Euler's Theorem to A(.,.) which is homogeneous of degree zero.

III. The Steady State Effects of Changes in Social Security

Let B(p) denote the actual ex post bequests (per capita) left by the
group of type p consumers born at the beginning of period t.

Letting B(p)

denote the bequests (per capita) of the consumers who died young and B(p)

denote

the bequests (per capita) of the consumers who survived two periods,

and recalling

that a fraction p of type p consumers dies young, we obtain

B(p) =

pB(p)

+

(1—p)B(p)

(18)

The homotheticity of preferences implies that B(p) and B(p) are each propor-

tional to the expected present value of lifetime income so that (18) may be
rewritten as

B(p) =

O(pA)[IfY_T+çlS1

(19)

where I is the initial bequest (per capita) received at birth; At is the
rate of return on annuities purchased at the end of period t (and which pay
off in period t+1). An

expression for 6(pAt) is given iii Appendix A. We will

asse that O<e(p1A)<1 for L <

< H12

H

Define B( B(p)dH(p) to be the average bequest left by members of the

generation born at time t. It follows from (19) that

B O(At) [] + Y — T +AS]
where

(20a)

— 12 —

=

In the steady state B =
rewritten

I

e(pAt)an(p)

(20b)

so that (dropping the time subscript) (20a) may be

as

B

AJ

=

(Y—T+AS)

(21)

1-(A)
We assume that

A fully funded social security system operates by collecting T from each
young consumer and investing the proceeds in riskiess capital earning a gross

rate of return R. In the following period the social security tax cum

interest, RT, is divided equally among the surviving consumers. Since a fraction 1—p of the consumers survives to the second period, the payment S
received

by each surviving consumer is

S=AT
where we recall that

(22)

Equation (22) shows that the

is defined as RJ(1—.

marginal rate of return implicit in the social security system, 4,

is

A

which, as we have shown in Section II, is greater than A, the equilibrium rate

of return on private annuities. Therefore,. an actuarially fair increase in
social security taxes and benefits increases the expected present value lifetime income I + Y — T +

We will confine our

A1S,

for a given level of inherited wealth I.

attention

to a small increase in S and T starting

frc am initial steady state in which S=O.

It follows immediately from (lTb)

that a(I*+Y_T)I S=O = 0 so that
dAt

Thus, an increase in fully funded

S=0

— 8A < 0
—

(23)

social security reduces the steady state

— 13

rate

—

of return on annuities.

Henceforth, we

asse

that a1 (logarithmic utility) so that, as shown in

Appendix D, '(A) < 0. The state state level of bequests is found by substi—
tuting (22) into (21) to obtain

B = p(A)

(Y+(A— 1)S)

(24)

1-0(A)

Differentiating (24) with respect to S yields

dS S0 =

(A)
[A
—

-

+

1—0(A)

'(A)
—

(1—0(A))4

where the inequality follows from A<A

,

y dAp
dS s=o

> 0

(25)

0'(A)<O and (23). The increase in B*

occurs for two reasons. First, since social security pays a higher rate of
return than private annuities, the introduction of social security raises (by

(A1 —

X 1)dS)

the expected present value of lifetime resources for a given

initial wealth. Second, the fall in A causes the share of lifetime resources

passed on as bequests, (A), to rise. Therefore, the factor

in (21)
1 —( A)

rises.

Next we examine the effect of social security on the steady state level
of average consumption of the young. 4

4

, where

= (A)(B*+Y—T+AS)

where

B
6(p,A)dB(p)<1

(26b)

— 14 —

With

is invariant to A. Therefore, the effect of

logarithmic utility, (A)

social

security on 4

increases

is proportional to the effect on B*+Y_T+AT'S which

as a result of three effects:

since the

gross

(1) B* rises as shown in (25); (2)

return on social security, SIT, exceeds A, it follows that

—T+AS rises for a given A; and (3) A falls as shown in (23) so that, A1S,

the present value of the social security payment, rises. Therefore, the
expected present value of lifetime resources rises and a fortiori the average
consumption of young consumers also rises.14

The steady state private capital stock at the end of a period is equal to

the saving of young consumers B*+Y—T—c1*. In a fully funded social security
system, the end—of--period capital stock held by the government is T.

steady state national capital stock K

The

is the sum of private capital and

government capital

(27)

Substituting (24) and (26a) into (27) yields

•= + (A)[Y+A_1_

)S1

(28)

1-(A)
Differentiating (28) with respect to S, we obtain

W

—
's—o

=

+

(1—(A))2

4"A)

(K'

TA 1)

(29)

1—(A)

Since '(A)<O it follows from (23) that the first term on the right hand side

of (29) is positive. Since A>A
(29)

is

will

the second term on the right hand side of

<(A)<1. In
positive so that

be positive if

unambiguously

1

this case, the right hand side of (29)
the introduction of fully funded social

15 —

security

will increase the steady state natci capits. stck

provides conditions

under .bich ((A)<i. Lt.itive1y. the

Appendix C

beç'est

motive as

measured by X must be sufficiently strong so that a iarer share of lifetime

resources is devoted to beq.ests than to firt—period onsptin.

the

In the case in which

first term on the right band

remains positive, but the second term

is negative.

if the

bequest

of (29)

Observe that if )O, then

and the first term om the right band side of
Thus,

side

motive is sufficiently weak, then an

funded social security will rethce the total national

pitai

becomes zero.
in fully

took in the

steady state. Thus we have shown

<

*

0 if X is small

—

dS S—0
>

if (A) < tA) ( 1

(30)

— 16 —

IV.

Conclusion

In this paper 'we have developed an overlapping generations model based on

individual utility maximization subject to uncertainty about the date of
death. We used this model to examine the dynamic behavior of consimption and

bequests in an econcny 'with consiuners who have different probabilities of
dying. Even though there are markets in annuities and in riskless bonds, con—
sumers are unable to offset the introduction of actuarially fair social secu—

rity. The reason is that adverse selection in the private annuity market
leads to a rate of return on private annuities which is lower than the rate of
return implicit in compulsory social security.

The introduction of actuarially fair social security raises the steady
state average levels of bequests and first—period consimption; it reduces the

steady state rate of return on private annuities. If the bequest

motive is

sufficiently weak, then an increase in fully funded social security benefits
reduces private wealth by more than one—for--one. With a sufficiently strong
bequest motive, an increase in social security taxes crowds out private wealth
by less than one—for—one.

—1—
Footnotes
1.

The seminal work in this area is Yaari (1965), which provided the framework for later work by Eakausson (1969), Fischer (1973), Richard (1975),
Levhari and Mirnian (1977), Barro and Friedman (1977) and Kotlikoff and
Spivak (1981).

2.

Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) examine the role of the family in providing
an (incomplete) annuities market but stop short of a full—scale overlapping generations model in which the intra—cohort distribution of bequests
is determined endogenously.

3.

See Kotlikoff, Shoven and Spivak (1983) and Karni and Zilcha (1984) for
interesting extensions of the overlapping generations model in which consumers within a cohort have different ex post mortality experiences.

4.

Their analysis is more general than an analysis of annuity markets which
are based on lifetime uncertainty; it applies more generally to mandatory
insurance as a partial remedy for adverse selection in insurance markets.
In particular, Eckstein, Eichenbaum and Peled pay careful attention to
various concepts of equilibrium.

5.

We follow Yaari (1965), Hakansson (1969), Fischer (1973) and Richard
(1975) in specifying utility as a function of the size of the bequest
left to one's heir. An alternative formulation which also gives rise to
a bequest motive is to specify utility as a function of one's heir's
utility as in Barro (1974) and Drazen (1978).
The specification of utility as a function of the size of the
bequest left to one's heir was chosen for tractability. The substantive
results of this paper do not depend on choosing this specification rather
than the specification suggested by Barro (1974). In particular, the
fast that social security affects consumption and capital accumulation
depends, not on the particular specification of the bequest motive, but
rather on the fact that adverse selection drives a wedge between the
rates of return on social security and on private annuities. In the
absence of adverse selection, fully funded social security would not
affect consumption regardless of whether the bequest motive is specified
as in this paper or as in Barro (1974).

6.

Sheshinski and Weiss (1981) have derived a similar result in a model
which is similar in spirit, but different in detail from the model in
this paper.

7.

If A > j, then all of the results in this paragraph are reversed.

8.

To derive this implication, we observe that (as will be argued below)

competition in the annuity market will prevent the rate of return A from

being less than

R

Let N(p,A) be the numerator of q1(p,A) in (A—8b),

'—p

i.e., N(p,A)

1 +

[1 ()a()a]
—

Observe that 8N/ôp < 0 and

—2—
8N/8A > 0. Next observe that N(p11, RL) will be positive if and only if
i—p

1
a

L

D

H

H which will be true if and only if equation (12)

>

'—p

1 +X

holds. Note that the term on the left of the first inequality in (12) is
less than pH since this term can be written as
—i
[1 +

(1H)[(1

+

)a

)a_1])1E Therefore, given H X, and a, the set
is not empty.

of possible values for

Since we have shown that (12) implies that N(PH, RL) > 0, it foil—p

lows from 8N/8p < 0 and aN/aA>0 that N(p,A) > 0 for p jp11 and A >

RL if
'—p

-

(12) holds. Therefore, equation (12) implies that q1(p,A)> 0, since the
denominator of the right hand side of (A—8b) is positive.
9.

The Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) demonstration that there cannot be a
pooling equilibrium depends on their assumption "that customers can buy
only one insurance contract". As they point out themselves, "this is an
objectionable assumption" (p. 632). The appropriate equilibrium concept
in the presence of monitoring of purchases from other companies still
requires further research. The equilibrium described in this paper has
some desirable characteristics and is suitable for our purposes.

10. The proof

of this lemma is
H

H

p

p

p*

I f(p)g(p)dB(p) =

I

I

f(p)g(p)dH(p) +

L

L

p

f(p)g(p)dH(p)

p

p

B

p*

g(p)[ I f(p)dH(p) +

I

p

f(p)dH(p)] =

0.

q.e.d.

L
p

11. More generally, when a is not equal to one we ave not ruled out multiNonetheless, we can
ple roots of ir(A) = 0 in the interval (

L'—

rule out as possible equilibria those ro fo1rwhich i'(A) > 0 by
observing that if such an A were the prevailing rate of return on private
annuities, a firm could offer a slightly higher rate of return and profitably attract all annuity purchases. Thus the equilibrium rate A is
characterized by n'(A) < 0. Henceforth, we assume that this inequality

—3—
holds strictly.

12. See Appendix C for conditions under which O(p,A)<1.

13. In Appendix C, we present condition under which O<e(A)<1. Thesecondi—
tions guarantee that B*>O if Y—T+A S>O and will guarantee that B
approaches the steady state B* monotonically.

14. It can also be shown that wth with logarithmic utility the introduction
of actuarially fair social security leads to an increase in the amount of
riskiess bonds held in the portfolios of young consumers. This result
fllows froin1the fact that riskless bond holdings are proportional to

A(I+Y—T+A S). (Substitut4g (A—3b) into (A15b) i Appendix A and then
sehing e equal to 1 yields 6 = [I+&(l—p+X)1
p&.Rj.) Since theAintro_

duction of social security leads to a reduction in X, the factor
rises. We have already shown that the steady state expected presen
value of lifetime income rises with the introduction of social security.
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Appendix A

In this Appendix we calculate the optimal values of 01,c2,

and BS for

the case in which U() and V() each have constant relative risk aversion equal
to a .

Because U'(c) =

c0

and V'(B) =

)Ba,

the first—order conditions (6a—

c) may be rewritten as
1

C1

(A—la)

[(i—p)&?.A] aBS
1

02

B' =

(A—lb)

aJ3

=

[P (y))aBs

(A—ic)

Substituting (A—la—c) into the lifetime budget constraint (5)

1 —l
BS = A(I+Y—T)+S—(A[(i-p)&XA]

yields

1

a++(i)&-)a}B5
R
p

(A—2)

Re—writing (A—2) , we obtain

BS = 05(p,A)(I+Y—T +

AS)

(A—3a)

where

OS(pA) = A(l+

+[(l_P)5X)aAa +

()a(y)a)_1

(A-3b)

Substituting (A—3) into (A—la) and simplifying yields

Cl

= (p,A)(I+Y—T+A1S)

(A—4a)

where

ii-i
6(p,A) = {l+&aAa

1

1 11

1_i

[(l_p)(i+Xa)+paAa(j) a]F1

(A—4b)

To obtain an expression for BD, substitute (A3—a) into (A—ic) which
yields

BD = OD(p,A)(I+y_T+A—is)

(A—5a)

wh crc

(2)°()oS(p,A)

OD(P,A) =

(A—5b)

The average bequest left by a type p consumer, B*(p), is equal to

(i_p)BS.

PBD +

Therefore, from (A—3) and (A—5) it follows that

B*(p) =

O(p,A)(I+Y—T+AS)

(A—6a)

where

O(p,A) =

[i-p + P(iP)a(L)a]OS(P,A)

(A-6b)

Finally we calculate the demand for private annuities by substituting

(A—ib) and (A—ic) into (4) to obtain

Q(p,A)+AS =

(i+xa_()a(y)a)A_lBs

(A-7)

Substituting (A—3a,b) into (A—7) yields

(A—Ba)

Q(p,A)+AS q1(p,A)(I+y_T+A1S)
where

-

iP A) =

q

(

1

i ii

(A—Sb)
1

i

i*ôa(i_p)aA+X i+()a(Aj)a

Atendix B
In this Appendix we show that under logarithmic utility, ( =

1),

and

with I+Y—T>O and SO, n(A) is strictly concave for A>R.

First we differentiate (14) twice ,{th respect to A to obtain

+ 2- ff + ftQ*M]dfl(p)

=

(Hi)

8A2

L 8A2
p

From (13), it follows that

= _11_
(B3)
8 A2

Setting a=1 in (A—8b) and differentiating with respect to A yields

=

(p)

(B4)

> 0

(A—R)2

Differentiating (lOb) with respect to A and using (B4) we obtain

=

'(p)[A

1, ]

+

(B5)

(A-R)2

It follows from (B4) and (B5) that

ff

=

t(p)(I+Y—T)+ø(p)(A2
(A—R)2

p&X
(A—R)2

Differentiating (B6) with respect to A yields

8—. =

—2t&XR6(p)(I+y_T)_2Ø(p)[A3+

8A2

(A—R)3

t)&X is
(A—R)3

(B7)

Substituting (13), (Hi), (Hi), (B6), and (B'7) into (Hi) yields

=

—2()

[P

(I+Y—T)+[A+ P ]RS)dH(p)<O, if A>R

(A—R)3

(A—R)3

(BS)

Appendix C

In

this Appendix we restrict our

utility (a = 1)
which

attention

to the case of logarithmic

and derive conditions under which

<

and conditions under

< 1. We begin by defining the function '(p,q) as

+

1P))]

(Cl)

Now define p* (L < p* < pH) as the probability of dying young which is implicit in the rate of return on private annuities, i.e.,

R =

Frc*i

(l_p*)A

the definition of 6(p,A) in (A—6b)

(C2)

and using (A—3b) and (A—4b) it

can be shown that with logarithmic utility (a = 1)

O(p,A)

(C3)

6(p)8)A[(l—p)2+p2]

Then using (Cl) and (C2), we may rewrite (C3) as

O(p,A) =

Differentiating

(C4}

6(p)BRy(p,p*)

y(p,q) twice with respect to p and q demonstrates that

y(p,q) is strictly convex in p and in q so that

(p,q) 1[y(pL,q), y(pHq)]

sup y(p,q) =

max[y(pp

''

(C5)

H

7'P'P

It can also be shown that

mm

Combining

(C5),

y(p,q)

=

(C6) and (C7 ), we obtain

y(p,p)

= X

(C7)

(C8)

y(p,q) < x[y(pL,p11), 7(R,L)] for

Note that for a given p'-' (or PH), .y(pL,pH) and (H,L) are maximized by

(or minimizing DL). Recall, however, that we have restricted

maximizing

the values of L and p11 in (12) in order to asse positive demands for annui—

H
yields

ties by all consiers. Setting p- equal to its lower bound

(C9)

< j(l—p11+X)(X+p11)

Similarly, setting p =

1+XL

we

obtain
(do)

7(LH) ( J(1_L÷),)+L)
Frmi (C9) and (do), it follows that

(Cli)

y(p,q) < 1[X+X2+max(pI1-p11 lL)]
From (Cli) it

follows that
y(p,q)

1

<

if

(C12a)

< pL < p11

or if 2 <

(C12b)

Thus horn (C4) and (C12), and recalling the definitions of

0 <

if

8K . 1 and if .

and ,

< max[pl,(3/4)i1'2]

we have

(c13)

Next we establish conditions under which Ô < 8 < 1. It follows immediately from (C4) that

6(p,A) 1 8K

sup 0(p)

K

sup

y(p,q.)

(Cl4)

(H_L)(l_LR) it follows from (Cli) that if

Since

1 1, then

=

p y(p,q)

(1+pj

(C15)

Using the definition of (p). (C15) may be rewritten as

)+ ,

sup (p,q)
L

p ..p,qIp

ô(p)

H

Using (C16) and the fact that

sup 0(p) =

Ø(H),

O(pA) < H (l_6(H))+P < H, if
Now suppose that 6 = H =
that 6(p,A) < 1 and hence 6 < 1.
O(p,A) ..

=1

f

(C16)

pL+pll< 1.

(C14) yields

+ pH < 1

and that pL+pH.. 1.

(C17)

It follows from (Cu)

It follows from (C4) and (C8) that

6(p) with strict inequality for p

p.

Therefore 6 >

have established the existence of parameter values for which

SO

that

< 1.

we

Appendix D

In this Appendix, we show that with logarithmic utility (a

0.

if S =

1), '(A)1O

It follows from the definition of (A) in (20b) that

=

h1dfl(p)

(Dl)

Differentiating (C3) with respect to A yields

1LPA1 = _(p)o[pR+(l_p)(A_R)]M.AJ

(D2)

(A— R)2

Substituting (Dl) into (D2) yields

H
=

—tf(p)g(p)dH(p)<0 if S0

(D3a)

where
f(p) =

—k

M(p,A)Q(p,A)

(D3b)

(A-R)2

g(p) =

.LP?i3.ft)_1&

(D3c)

The inequality in (D3a) follows immediately from the Lemma after observing

H
that I

f(p)dfl(p)

ir(A) = 0 and showing that g1(p)O. Below, we show

=
(A—R)2

that if S=O, then g'(p)>O.

Using (lOa), (A4b) and (A8b) we find that with logarithmic utility and
S= 0

a(Q/•) =

—6(l+?)(I+Y—T)

(D4)

Differentiating (D3c) with respect to p and using (D4) yields

g'(p)

1

-_----{62(1+2).)R(I+Y—T)) > 0

[Q(p,A)I$(p)]2

(D5)

